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The Influence of External 
Information on Collective 
Bargaining: Survey Evidence of 
Union and Firm Negotiators in  
the Netherlands
Alex Lehr, Agnes Akkerman and rené Torenvlied
External information is generally assumed to greatly affect collective bargain-
ing, yet rigorous empirical investigations of the influence of this information 
on union and firm negotiators are surprisingly scarce. Comprehensive stan-
dardized survey data measuring the influence of external information on 
negotiators in the Netherlands were analyzed to reveal the extent to which 
negotiators were influenced by different types of external information and 
how differences in these influences could be explained by the characteris-
tics of negotiators and bargaining units. the findings indicate that the influ-
ence of external information a) increased with proximity of the information 
source; b) was usually greater for union negotiators than for firm negoti-
ators; and in some cases c) modestly increased with negotiator experience; 
and d) was greater in company bargaining than in sector bargaining. 
KEywoRDs: collective bargaining, negotiators, information, survey, spillover. 
introduction
Theories explaining the outcomes of and conflicts in labour contract negotia-
tions commonly model the behaviour of actors that have the power to take deci-
sions at the bargaining table, i.e. the negotiators, as a function of their know-
ledge and evaluation of various types of information (e.g. Walton and McKersie, 
1965: 44, 61-63; Dunlop, 1957). Such information may either be internal (char-
acteristics of the bargaining event itself), or external (contextual characteristics 
of the bargaining event) (c.f. Blanchflower and Oswald, 1988; Abowd, 1989). 
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Despite the central role attributed to the influence of information on negotiators, 
rigorous empirical analyses of this influence are scarce. Many studies instead rely 
on anecdotal evidence or opt to simply build on a priori assumed influences. To 
the extent that direct empirical evidence of the influence of information on nego-
tiators does exist, it is usually limited to one side of the bargaining table, ignoring 
that bargaining is a joint decision-making process. In this paper, we present a 
systematic study of the influence of different types of external information on 
union and firm negotiators in collective bargaining in the Netherlands, and offer 
explanations for the variation in this influence. 
Our first goal was to answer the following question: to what extent are nego-
tiators in collective bargaining influenced by different types of external informa-
tion? We developed a questionnaire survey measuring self-reported influences of 
different types of external information on union and firm negotiators. A particu-
lar strength of our survey is that it offers an extensive, standardized analysis of 
the direct impact of spillovers from the past and from other bargaining units on 
negotiators, circumventing identification problems associated with establishing 
such effects (c.f. Mitchell, 1982; Heckman, 1991; Manski, 1993). 
The extent to which external information affects bargaining behaviour is likely 
to vary across different types of negotiators (c.f. Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969, 
Mauro, 1982) and different types of bargaining units (c.f. Cousineau and Lacroix, 
1986). The second goal of our study was therefore to shed light on a second 
question: how can differences in the reported influence of external information 
between negotiators be explained by the characteristics of the negotiators and 
bargaining units? To our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive quantitative 
analysis of variations in the influence of external information on negotiators in 
collective bargaining.
theory and hypotheses
Bargaining theory typically assumes that negotiators do not have complete 
information on critical aspects of the bargaining event they are involved in. In col-
lective bargaining, these critical aspects are bargaining power (Leap and Grigsby, 
1986; Svejnar, 1986; Cousineau and Lacroix, 1986; Martin, 1992), employers’ 
ability to pay (Hayes, 1984; Cramton and Tracy, 2003) and norms concerning fair 
outcomes (Hyman and Brough, 1975; Frank, 1984; Rees, 1993). As negotiators 
aim to overcome their uncertainty regarding such aspects, they turn to external 
information that may serve as a proxy. We distinguish four types of external 
information: 1- economic information, 2- information on organizational power, 
3- institutional information, and 4- information spillovers. 
In the following section, we explain our selection of the types of external 
information in our analysis, based on common assumptions and findings of 
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labour relations research. Because we aim to provide standardized measurements, 
this selection is by necessity not exhaustive and we recognize that other relevant 
indicators may be suggested. Following the presentation of the chosen types of 
external information, we develop testable hypotheses concerning the influence 
of external information from extant theory, common assumptions and empirical 
findings. 
types of external information
Empirical studies consistently find a relationship between economic factors 
and collective bargaining outcomes and conflicts, as bargaining strategies are 
shaped by negotiators’ perceptions of these factors. The economic indicators most 
commonly found to affect collective bargaining are prices and employment 
(Franzosi, 1989; Card, 1990; Kaufman, 2002; Cramton and Tracy, 2003). There-
fore, we investigated the influence of information on employment and pricing 
developments on negotiators. We distinguished between different levels at which 
these developments operate and analyzed those that were most pertinent for 
each type of factor within our empirical context. For employment, this entailed 
differentiating between national, sectoral and local developments. For pricing, 
we focused on international, national and sectoral developments.
Organizational power also substantially affects collective bargaining (Franzosi, 
1989; c.f. Shorter and Tilly, 1974). At the macro level, unionization is the primary 
factor of interest, as it reveals crucial information on unions’ ability to mount 
collective action. However, as we were concerned with factors that affect the 
behaviour of individual negotiators, there may be more informative indicators 
of power.1 The first indicator we considered was militancy, defined as the readi-
ness of employees to partake in industrial action.2 If employees are more willing 
to partake in industrial action, the ability of a union to inflict costs upon the 
firm through strike action will increase, giving them relatively more leverage. 
Similarly, strike funds determine the power of the union vis-à-vis the firm (Clegg, 
1976; Skeels and McGrath, 1997). Public opinion can also influence bargaining 
power, as the public’s reaction to a firm’s behaviour during collective bargaining 
may hurt sales while unions may depend on public support to mobilize workers 
(Chamberlain and Kuhn, 1986: 189-191). We therefore studied the influence 
of information on three organizational power factors: a- workers’ readiness for 
industrial action; b- union strike funds; and c- public opinion. 
The third type of external information we considered was related to institu-
tional factors. Here, it was important to consider the specifics of the Dutch case. 
In the Netherlands, collective bargaining occurs at both the company and sector 
level, with the sector level being dominant and sector level contracts sometimes 
setting a framework for company level bargaining (EIRO, 2008). Moreover, col-
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lective bargaining is multileveled, as central agreements of labour and employer 
peak organizations provide a non-legally binding benchmark for both company 
and sector level agreements (Torenvlied and Akkerman, 2004). Through ILO con-
ventions, the European Social Charter, and a more general trend towards Euro-
peanization of employment relations (Brandl and Traxler, 2009; EUROFOUND, 
2012), collective bargaining is also affected by international developments. Given 
this complex context, we chose the focus our analyses of external information 
on developments related to collective agreements on five levels: a- international; 
b- national; c- sectoral; d- local; and e- comparable companies.
External information related to collective agreement developments may not 
only reflect institutional aspects. Although pattern bargaining, i.e. reiterated, long-
term stable and explicit co-ordination (c.f. Traxler et al., 2008) does not feature 
prominently in the Netherlands (Van Rij and Rojer, 1998), different collective 
agreements are not independent of each other. Information on other bargaining 
events affects negotiators through spillovers. Traditionally, spillovers have been 
associated with the influence of specific information on bargaining outcomes, 
i.e. wages, across different bargaining units (e.g. Christofides et al., 1980; 
Babcock et al., 2005). Yet spillover may also occur over time within bargaining 
units, for instance, because past settlements affect future settlements directly, 
leading to history-dependence (Card, 1990, Bewley, 1999). Moreover, spillovers 
across and within bargaining units are not limited to outcomes. Negotiators also 
take into account information on conflicts and conflict potential (e.g. Mauro, 
1982; Schnell and Gramm, 1987; Campolieti et al., 2005; Kuhn and Gu, 1999). 
We investigated this complex array of spillovers by measuring the influence 
of information on: a- outcomes; b- employees’ readiness for industrial action; 
and c- the success of industrial action. We differentiated each of these types of 
informational content according to the following three potential sources: a- the 
same bargaining unit in the past; b- other bargaining units in the same sector; 
and c- other sectors. 
spillovers and proximity
Spillovers from different sources are likely to have different relevance. Wage 
spillovers have traditionally been considered to be a phenomenon that occurs with-
in sectors. The implicit argument is that for spillovers to occur, information must 
be sufficiently relevant. For instance, spillovers driven by social comparisons (e.g. 
Babcock et al., 2005) arise because workers take the wages of workers in other 
bargaining units as relevant reference points (c.f. Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) if 
these other workers closely resemble themselves (c.f. Festinger, 1954). Alternatively, 
spillovers may also be driven by a process of rational learning (Kuhn and Gu, 1999), 
which can only occur if the outcomes and conflicts of bargaining in one bargaining 
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unit reveal private information in other bargaining units because this information is 
correlated within sectors(Lehr and al., 2013). Spillovers within sectors may thus be 
expected to have more influence than spillovers across sectors. However, the most 
important reference point for current wages are past wages within the bargaining 
unit (Bewley, 1999). Similarly, past conflict (potential) in a bargaining unit is pre-
sumably the best indicator for future potential outcomes of conflict. 
Ordering sources of spillover by their proximity to the current bargaining event, we 
expected that information on the past experience of the bargaining unit would have 
the most influence on negotiators, followed by information on the experience of other 
bargaining units within the same sector, while information on the experience of other 
sectors would have the least influence (H1). 
union and firm negotiators 
A common assumption in bargaining theory is that one bargaining party will 
have better information than the other, i.e. information is asymmetric. Asymmet-
ric information models became a standard solution to the Hicks (1932) bargaining 
paradox in the 1980s, and remain highly influential. Bargaining is thought of as 
the division of an economic surplus between the firm(s) and workers represented 
by their union(s) (Cramton and Tracy, 2003). The critical aspect of the bargain-
ing event is the firm’s ability to pay, which is commonly assumed to be known 
to firms but can only be estimated by unions (Hayes, 1984). Alternatively, it has 
been argued that it is actually the employer’s willingness rather than ability to pay 
that characterizes wage bargaining (Bewley, 1999). Regardless of this distinction, 
unions are generally thought of as being at an informational disadvantage. 
Moreover, through their actions in the bargaining process, negotiators reveal 
information on their willingness to concede. In practise, trade unions formulate 
a demand that firms can respond to by acceptance or a counteroffer. This allows 
firms to learn about the union’s willingness to concede before revealing their 
own, adding to the uncertainty that unions face relative to the uncertainty that 
firms face. 
Therefore the need to reduce uncertainty by using external information should be 
higher among union negotiators than among firm negotiators and we expected that 
external information would have more influence on union negotiators than on firm 
negotiators (H2). 
Experience
There are two different possible accounts of the relationship between negotiator 
experience and the influence of external information. Montgomery and Benedict 
(1989) argue that more experienced negotiators are less likely to experience 
strikes because experienced negotiators are better able to ascertain the true value 
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of the unobservable aspects critical to reaching an agreement. Similarly, Reder 
and Neuman (1980) propose that bargaining units consisting of more experienced 
negotiators are less likely to strike because negotiators learn to anticipate each 
other’s behaviour. It may therefore be argued that experience reduces negotiators’ 
uncertainty, which in turn limits their need for external information. 
This leads us to the following hypothesis: the more experience negotiators have, the 
less they are influenced by external information (H3A).
However, it is equally plausible to argue the reverse. Reder and Neuman (1980) 
maintain that in bargaining units that bargain repeatedly, negotiators learn from 
past bargaining events. This may be interpreted as spillover within the bargaining 
unit over time. Anecdotally, Rees (1993) illustrates how, through his repeated 
personal involvement in wage setting, he became aware of the importance of 
external wage comparisons. More generally, it may be argued that, as negoti-
ators become more experienced, they learn to use external information and con-
sequently face less uncertainty. 
We therefore propose the alternative hypothesis that the more experience negotiators 
have, the more they are influenced by external information (H3B).
Bargaining level
In the Netherlands, there is a mix of single and multi-employer bargaining. Fol-
lowing Olson’s (1982) idea that organized interest is most disruptive to society when 
it is strong enough to have considerable impact without being so encompassing 
that it substantially bears the costs it creates, Calmfors and Driffhill (1988) argue 
that there is a hump-shaped relationship between the level of bargaining central-
ization and economic performance. Their theory yields predictions for comparisons 
of different industrial relations systems, however, it may also yield propositions for 
within-country comparisons. Calmfors and Driffhill argue that that decentralized, 
i.e. company level bargaining, is largely subject to market forces, while intermedi-
ate levels of centralization, i.e. sector level bargaining, can operate in relative in-
dependence from its economic environment. Assuming perfect product-market 
competition, a single company in isolation cannot raise wages without incurring 
decreased competitiveness and employment. Sector-level bargaining, on the other 
hand, allows negotiators to pass on negative externalities because they can jointly 
raise prices. We may thus expect that, compared to company-level bargaining, 
sector-level bargaining is primarily concerned with developments within the sector 
and takes place under relative autonomy from its economic environment. 
 Therefore, we tested the hypothesis that information on international, national 
and local economic developments will have less influence on negotiators in sector 
agreements than on negotiators in company agreements (H4). 
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Sector-level bargaining is dominant in the Netherlands and sector agreements 
often set the framework for company level bargaining. Moreover, company bar-
gaining is prevalent in particular branches and regions, such as transport and 
storage in the Rotterdam harbour. This induces direct labour-market competi-
tion among these bargaining units as well as a high level of interdependence of 
organizationally derived bargaining power, e.g. correlated militancy and strike 
funds. 
 Hence we expected that local collective agreement developments, collective 
agreement developments in comparable companies and spillovers across bargaining 
units would have more influence on negotiators in company agreements than on 
negotiators in sector agreements (H5). 
the empirical context
The Netherlands features state-sponsored coordination (Traxler, 2003) with 
bipartite and tripartite consultation. Non-binding central agreements that serve 
as benchmarks for lower level bargaining (Akkermen and Torenvlied, 2002) are 
negotiated in the bipartite Labour Foundation (Stiching van de Arbeid). Tripartite 
processes take place in the Social Economic Council (Sociaal Economische Raad), 
which advises on general social economic decisions (EIRO, 2008). 
Approximately 1000 collective agreements are in effect and roughly one fifth 
of these are sector agreements. Approximately 84 percent of the labour force is 
covered by a collective agreement (EIRO, 2008), four fifths of which through sector 
agreements. In some sectors, there are both company and sector level agree-
ments. High collective bargaining coverage is maintained despite the trade union 
density being comparatively low at approximately 24% (EIRO, 2008) because 
collective agreements apply to both unionized and non-unionized workers in a 
workplace and because the extension of collective agreements to whole sectors 
is common (c.f. Rojer, 2002). The three major Dutch trade union federations are 
divided by religion, ideology and occupational status. Collective bargaining often 
involves more than one union (Akkerman, 2000). 
Overt industrial conflict in the Netherlands is rare. According to official statis-
tics, between 2005 and 2011 there were between 17 and 31 strikes annually, 
only about half of which were the result of conflicts in collective bargaining (CBS, 
2012). The number of working days lost in this period was generally lower than 
that in most other European countries, peaking at 120.600 in 2008 and dropping 
as low as 4.600 in 2009 (Ibid., 2012). However, compared to other countries, 
industrial action in the Netherlands is often prevented by court rulings, which 
frequently appeal to potential harm to third-party interests (EIRO, 2002; EURO-
FOUND, 2012). 
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Data and measurements
sample
We gathered questionnaire survey data among negotiators involved in collective 
bargaining in the Netherlands (2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey). The data collection 
took place between October 2011 and January 2012. One hundred and fifty (150) 
collective agreements were selected via randomization from all existing Dutch col-
lective agreements. The sampling frame was limited to agreements with starting 
dates from 1 January 2009 to 1 April 2011. This interval was chosen to minimize 
the risk of introducing retrospective bias while simultaneously minimizing the risk 
of selecting agreements for which negotiations were still in progress.3 
 We used all available documents related to the selected collective agree-
ments to compile a list of contact data for the negotiators involved in the collec-
tive agreements. This initial list comprised 302 negotiators, who were invited via 
email to fill out an online questionnaire. For negotiators who had been involved 
in more than one of the selected collective agreements, we asked for information 
on only one of these agreements. A snowball question was included, asking for 
the names and contact information of the five most important other negotiators 
involved in bargaining for the agreement. These negotiators were subsequently 
also invited to participate. Combining these sampling methods, we were able 
to ask 409 negotiators to participate in our study, of which 58.1% were union 
representatives and 41.9% were firm representatives. 123 negotiators represent-
ing 73 of the 150 agreements completed the questionnaire.4 The distribution of 
union and firm negotiators and the representation of company and sector agree-
ments in this sample were highly comparable to the sampling frame, and there 
were no indications of other sources of non-response bias. 
measures
External information
We set out to investigate the influence on negotiators of information on eco-
nomic, organizational power and institutional indicators, as well as the influence 
of spillovers. To this end, we created two sets of items in our questionnaire.
As for the first set of items, we asked respondents whether the following 
types of information influenced them in general during collective bargaining: 
1- “national employment levels”; 2- “local employment levels”; 3- “employment 
in the relevant sector”; 4- “international pricing developments”; 5- “national pric-
ing developments”; 6- “pricing developments in the relevant sector”; 7- “inter-
national collective agreement developments”; 8- “national collective agreement 
developments”; 9- “collective agreement developments in the relevant sector”; 
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10- “collective agreement developments in comparable companies”; 11- “local 
collective agreement developments”; 12- “employees’ readiness for industrial 
action”; 13- “union strike funds”; and 14- “public opinion”. When the response 
was positive, we asked the negotiators to rate how important that type of infor-
mation was to them in general during collective bargaining, on a scale of “1” = 
“not very important” to “5” = “very important.” We then recoded each of these 
issues into a variable with a six-point scale, where “0” represented “not mentioned 
as an influence,” “1” represented “mentioned but not very important,” and the 
maximum value of “5” represented “mentioned and very important.”
The second set of items specifically examined the influence of information spill-
overs from other bargaining events. We asked the respondents to rate how strongly 
they agreed with nine statements. Three statements referred to information on the 
outcomes of other bargaining events. The other six items referred to information 
on conflict, divided into: a- the readiness for industrial action and b- the success of 
industrial action. Furthermore, we differentiated each type of information accord-
ing to three different possible sources: a- the past experience of the bargaining 
unit, b- that of other companies in the same sector and c- that of other sectors. 
This yielded nine unique statements (see Table 1) for the measurement of spillovers, 
with possible answers ranging from “1”= “not at all” to “5”= “very much.”
independent variables
In order to test for differences between union and firm negotiators in the re-
ported influence of external information, we created a variable with dummy coding 
for “union negotiator” (reference “firm negotiator”). To measure experience, for 
each negotiator, we calculated the number of years that he or she was active in col-
Table 1
Overview of Measurements of the Influence of Information on Other bargaining events
In general, during collective bargaining, I am influenced by information on…
Outcomes	for	the	same	collective	agreement	in	the	past
Outcomes	for	collective	agreements	in	other	companies	in	the	same	sector
Outcomes	for	collective	agreements	in	other	sectors
Past	readiness	for	industrial	action	of	the	employees	covered	by	the	collective	agreement
readiness for industrial action of employees in other companies in the same sector
readiness for industrial action of employees in other sectors
The	success	of	industrial	action	for	the	same	collective	agreement	in	the	past
the success of industrial action in other companies in the same sector
the success of industrial action in other sectors
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lective bargaining. As we asked the negotiators to report the influence that various 
types of external information had on them in general during collective bargaining, 
the measurement of bargaining unit characteristics was less straightforward. 
Negotiators in the Netherlands, especially union representatives, are often profes-
sionals who negotiate multiple collective agreements. We used the characteristics 
of the collective agreement for which the negotiators were selected into the sample 
as proxies and created a dummy variable for sector agreements, with company 
agreements as the reference category. This was based on the assumptions that ne-
gotiators will generally bargain for similar types of collective agreements.
Control variables 
Little is known about possibly confounding factors that may affect the analysis 
of the influence of external information on negotiators. We proposed four, namely, 
age, gender, coverage of the agreement and the economic sector. Age is presum-
ably positively associated with experience. Therefore, a tests of the relationship 
between experience and the influence of external information should control for 
potential life-cycle or cohort effects. Research suggests that there are gender differ-
ences in information processing (e.g. Graham, Myers and Stendardi, 2010). Conse-
quently, we controlled our findings using a dummy variable for “female” (reference 
“male”). Because sector agreements generally cover a greater number of workers 
than company agreements, we also controlled for coverage using a variable that 
counted the number of workers to which the agreement applied. To account for dif-
ferent economic contexts, we included a categorical economic sector control with 
four categories; “primary,” “secondary” (reference), “tertiary” and “quarternary.” 
analyses
Descriptive statistics
Characteristics of the collective agreements and the negotiators
The 123 negotiators included in our sample represented 73 unique collective 
agreements. 53 (72.6%) of these were company agreements, while 20 (27.4%) 
were sector agreements. The distribution of the number of employees covered 
by these agreements was right skewed, with the first three quartiles consisting of 
agreements covering fewer than 5000 employees, while the largest agreements 
covered several hundred thousand employees. The median number of employees 
covered was 820. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics on the negotiators. 62% of the re-
spondents were union negotiators, which does not deviate significantly from 
the proportion of union negotiators invited to participate. One fifth of the ne-
gotiators were female. The mean age was approximately 50 and on average the 
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negotiators had 13 years experience with collective bargaining. One third of the 
negotiators were selected through a sector agreement. The median coverage of 
the agreements across the individual negotiators was 1500 employees.
The influence of economic, organizational power, and institutional 
information
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics on the reported influence of informa-
tion on employment developments, pricing developments and collective agree-
ment developments on various levels, as well as the reported influence of infor-
mation on militancy, strike funds and public opinion. 
Regarding employment information, the highest mean was found for the in-
fluence of information on employment levels in the relevant sector. Lower values 
were found for information on national or local employment. We also found rela-
tively high averages for the influence of information on national and sector pric-
ing developments, especially compared to international pricing developments. 
These findings suggest that, besides being the dominant bargaining level, sector 
level economic developments were also the most important economic external 
influence on collective bargaining. 
Organizational power indicators influenced the negotiators less than the 
economic indicators. Information on militancy was moderately influential while 
information on union strike funds and public opinion had a very limited influ-
ence. The comparatively low impact of organizational power indicators may be 
explained by the low levels of overt industrial conflict in the Netherlands, which 
limits the strategic value of such information. 
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics Respondents 
 Valid N Min. Max. Mean Standard 
     deviation
Negotiator’s	age	 123	 27	 65	 49.69	 8.24
Negotiator’s	gender	female	(ref.	male)	 123	 0	 1	 20.33	
Union	negotiator	(ref.	firm	negotiator)	 123	 0.00	 1.00	 0.62	
Negotiator’s	experience	 123	 2.00	 32.00	 12.91	 7.50
Sector	agreement	(ref.	company	agreement)	 123	 0	 1	 0.33	
Coverage	 123	 18	 819500	 17892.20	 77157.53
Economic	sector	(ref.	secondary)	 	 	 	 	
Primary	 123	 0	 1	 0.08	
Tertiary	 123	 0	 1	 0.41	
Quarernary		 123	 0	 1	 0.07	
Source:	2011	Dutch	Negotiator	Survey.
338 relations industrielles / industrial relations – 70-2, 2015
National and sectoral collective agreement developments were highly 
influential, clearly reflecting both the multileveled nature of bargaining as 
well as the importance of sector agreements. In the context of increasing 
Europeanization and the openness of the Dutch economy, international 
collective agreement developments may be expected to play a significant role. 
Indeed, 63.41% of the negotiators reported that they were influenced by them. 
However, they were on average rated to be considerably less influential than 
national and sectoral developments. Local developments were also reported 
to have a rather modest influence, which suggests that, possibly related to 
the small country size, no substantial geographical dynamics were at play in 
the collective bargaining. However, we did find a very high mean value for 
the influence of information on collective agreement developments in other, 
comparable companies. Despite the lack of formal pace-setting, this suggests 
that there was a substantial amount of spillover across different bargaining 
units. A more detailed analysis of what these spillovers entailed is presented 
in the next section.
Table 3
Reported Influence of economic, Organizational and Institutional Information 
 Valid N Min. Max. Mean Standard 
     deviation
Employment	developments	 	 	 	 	
National	 123	 0	 5	 2.20	 1.63
Sector	 123	 0	 5	 3.39	 1.56
Local	 123	 0	 5	 2.03	 1.68
Pricing	developments	 	 	 	 	
International	 123	 0	 5	 1.84	 1.62
National	 123	 0	 5	 3.02	 1.70
Sector	 123	 0	 5	 3.14	 1.74
organizational indicators     
Militancy	 123	 0	 5	 2.52	 1.78
Strike	funds	 123	 0	 5	 1.07	 1.19
Public	opinion	 123	 0	 5	 1.56	 1.43
Collective	agreement	developments	 	 	 	 	
International	 123	 0	 5	 1.41	 1.41
National	 123	 0	 5	 3.66	 1.15
Sector	 123	 0	 5	 3.64	 1.37
Local	 123	 0	 5	 1.88	 1.77
Comparable	companies	 123	 0	 5	 3.34	 1.71
	Source:	2011	Dutch	Negotiator	Survey.
the inFluence oF eXternal inFormation on collective barGaininG: survey evidence oF union and 339 
Firm neGotiators in the netherlands 
The influence of spillovers
We measured the influence of spillover containing information on: 1) outcomes; 
2) the readiness of employees for industrial action; and 3) the success of industrial 
action; with each relating to: 1- the past experience of the same bargaining unit; 
2- that of other companies in the same sector; or 3- that of other sectors. The item 
nonresponse for these measurements varied between 6% and 21%. Additional 
analyses of the missing cases did not indicate any obvious non-response bias. 
Descriptive statistics for the nine measurements are presented in Table 4. 
Overall, information on outcomes had more influence than information on 
the readiness for, and success of industrial action. The level of influence also 
increased with proximity of the source of information, i.e. the past experience of 
the bargaining unit was rated to be more important than that of other compa-
nies in the same sector, while that of other sectors had the least impact. Paired 
t-tests indicated that these differences were all statistically significant (p<0.01, 
two-tailed) with mean differences ranging between 0.5 and 0.8 points. This sup-
ports hypothesis H1, predicting that influence would increase with proximity. 
 We found the highest mean score for the reported influence of information 
on bargaining outcomes for the same collective agreement in the past with a 
mean value of almost four on a five-point scale. This finding strongly supports 
history-dependent wage theories. In line with theories of wage spillover, there 
was also substantial evidence for spillovers across bargaining units, especially 
Table 4
Reported Influence of Spillover from Other bargaining events 
 Valid N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
     deviation
Outcomes	same	collective	agreement	past	 116	 1	 5	 3.97	 1.08
Outcomes	collective	agreements	other	 
companies	same	sector	 115	 1	 5	 3.47	 1.34
Outcomes	for	collective	agreements	 
other	sectors	 110	 1	 5	 3.07	 1.16
Past	readiness	for	industrial	action		 108	 1	 5	 3.38	 1.32
readiness for industrial action other  
companies	same	sector	 111	 1	 5	 2.57	 1.35
Readiness	for	industrial	action	other	sectors	 101	 1	 5	 2.07	 1.06
Past	success	of	industrial	action	 98	 1	 5	 3.46	 1.36
success of industrial action other companies  
same	sector	 107	 1	 5	 2.71	 1.33
Success	of	industrial	action	other	sectors	 97	 1	 5	 2.12	 1.10
Source:	2011	Dutch	Negotiator	Survey.
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within the same sector. However, the informational content of spillovers was not 
limited to outcomes. Information on conflict in other bargaining events also influ-
enced the negotiators considerably, as indicated by the mean values for the items 
measuring the influence of information on the employees’ readiness for, and the 
success of industrial action. Here too, the influence increased when sources were 
more proximate. These results lend empirical credence to theories that build on 
the assumption that conflicts in labour relations are interrelated, such as diffusion 
theory (c.f. Lehr et al., 2014) and theories on learning from conflict (e.g. Mauro, 
1982, Schnell and Gramm, 1987; Kuhn and Guhn, 1999). 
Explaining differences in the influence of external information5
To test our remaining hypotheses, we estimated (OLS) multivariate linear regres-
sion models for each of the external information measurements. Every model 
included main effects for the union negotiator dummy, negotiator experience, 
age, the female gender dummy, the sector agreement dummy, the log-transformed 
coverage variable and three dummies controlling for economic sector. We used 
standard errors that were robust to heteroscedasticity of the residuals (White, 
1980) for significance tests. For reasons of interpretability and space, only the 
coefficients for statistically significant effects are reported.6 Given constraints on 
statistical power due to the sample size and the directed nature of our hypoth-
eses, we took α=0.10 (two-tailed) as the critical value. 
Prior to the model estimations, we analyzed the bivariate associations between 
all independent and dependent variables by calculating Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients and applying independent sample t-tests where appropriate. These 
statistics are not presented here in full but we report any statistically significant 
(based on a liberal one-tailed critical value of α=0.10) bivariate association 
between the dependent and independent variables that did not persist in the 
multivariate analyses. In this way, we aim to provide both stringent hypotheses 
tests as well more tolerant descriptions of associations in our data. For the spillover 
measurements, the missing cases may reasonably be assumed to be missing at 
random and ignorable. As there were no missing cases on the independent 
variables, we used complete case analyses, which under these conditions can be 
considered to be unbiased and cannot be improved upon (Allison, 2001).
Explanatory analyses
Table 5 lists the estimates for the models explaining each of the general types 
of external information. Hypothesis H2 predicted that external information would 
have more influence on union negotiators than on firm negotiators. This hypothesis 
was partially supported by our findings. The reported influence of sectoral and lo-
cal employment developments, and militancy were all higher for union negotiators. 
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The effect was particularly large for militancy, where the predicted value on a six-
point scale was 1.35 points higher for union negotiators than for firm negotiators. 
The bivariate analyses suggest that information on national employment develop-
ments, strike funds, collective agreement developments in comparable companies 
also had more influence on union than on firm negotiators. 
We tested competing hypotheses concerning the direction of the association 
between experience and the influence of external information (H3a/b). The results 
of the multivariate analyses indicate that experience had statistically significant 
but small positive effects on the reported influence of militancy and international 
collective agreement developments. Modest positive bivariate correlations be-
tween experience and the influence of local employment developments, as well 
as international and national pricing developments were found. These results run 
against the hypothesis that, as experience increases, the influence of external in-
formation decreases (H3a) but offer some support for the alternative hypothesis 
that this influence increases as negotiators become more experienced (H3b). 
Within a single mixed bargaining system, we found very limited support for the 
proposition that sector bargaining is less influenced by its wider economic environ-
ment than company bargaining (H4). Controlling for other factors, negotiators in 
sector agreements were not found to be less affected by economic information than 
negotiators in company agreements. However, the mean of the reported influence 
of information on sectoral and local employment developments was found to be 
lower for sector bargaining than for company bargaining in the biviarate analyses. 
The influence of information on both international and local collective agree-
ment developments was lower for negotiators in sector agreements than for ne-
gotiators in company agreements. These findings partially support hypothesis H5 
and also suggest that, although the influence of international developments was 
limited, it was stronger for the generally more internationally exposed bargaining 
units that bargain individually. Also in line with hypothesis 5, the influence of col-
lective agreement developments in comparable companies was also found to be 
lower for negotiators in sector bargaining, but only in our bivariate analyses.
Table 6 summarizes the statistically significant effects on our nine measures 
of spillover as found in the multivariate analyses. On the whole, we found more 
support for the hypothesis that external information has more influence on union 
negotiators than on firm negotiators (H2), at least regarding conflict-related 
information on other bargaining events. In particular, the predicted influences of 
information on past readiness for, and the success of industrial action was higher 
for union negotiators by approximately one point on a five-point scale. Simi-
larly, information on the readiness for, and success of industrial action in other 
companies in the same sector and in other sectors had more influence on union 
negotiators, although here the differences were less extreme. 
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Surprisingly however, the two types of negotiators did not differ significantly 
regarding the reported influence of information on outcomes in other bargaining 
events, controlling for other factors. This suggests that effects which are tradition-
ally often ascribed to the formation of reference points by workers and unions, i.e. 
wage spillovers and state-dependency of wages, may actually have affected both 
sides of the bargaining table equally. This may be because employers correctly an-
ticipate the importance of such reference points to their counterparts (c.f. Bewely, 
1999), but it may also be the case that firm negotiators themselves are guided 
by external reference points rather than strictly by internal information on viable 
outcomes. However, it must be noted that bivariate tests did point towards more 
influence on union negotiators compared to firm negotiators for information on 
outcomes in other companies in the same sector and in other sectors.
We found no further evidence of the hypothesis that the influence of external 
information increases with experience (H3b) in our multivariate analyses, while 
bivariate tests even hinted at a negative correlation between the influence of the 
success of industrial action in other sectors and negotiator experience.
As predicted in hypothesis H5, spillovers had less influence on negotiators in 
sector bargaining than in company bargaining. The multivariate analyses sug-
gested that this was the case for the influence of past outcomes, as well as past 
readiness for, and the success of industrial action, and the success of industrial 
action in other companies in the same sector. However, the bivariate analyses 
did not show a uniform pattern. While the influence of outcomes in the same 
sector was lower in company bargaining than in sector bargaining, the influence 
of outcomes in other sectors and the readiness for industrial action in the same 
sector was actually higher. 
conclusion and discussion
The impetus for this research was the surprising lack of comparable empirical 
data on the influence of external information on union and firm negotiators, given 
the importance attributed to this information in theories explaining the outcomes 
and conflicts in collective bargaining. Using a standardized survey questionnaire 
measuring the influence of external information in the Netherlands, we sought 
to address two research questions: 1- to what extent are negotiators in collective 
bargaining influenced by different types of external information?; and 2- how can 
differences in the reported influence of external information between negotiators 
be explained by the characteristics of the negotiators and bargaining units?
Our analyses revealed a multifaceted picture of the influence of external infor-
mation on collective bargaining. Economic indicators (i.e. employment and pricing 
developments), particularly those operating at the sector level, had substantial in-
fluence on negotiators. Information on national and sectoral collective agreement 
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developments was also very influential, while indicators reflecting organizational 
power, i.e. militancy, strike funds and public opinion, were less important. 
Another major influence on negotiators was information on other bargain-
ing events, i.e. spillovers. We differentiated spillovers according to their source 
and informational content and found that information on outcomes had more 
influence than information on the readiness for, and success of industrial ac-
tion. The hypothesis that influence increases with the proximity of the source of 
spillover was also strongly supported, with information on the past experience of 
the bargaining unit having more influence than information on other bargaining 
units within the same sector, while information on other sectors had the least 
influence. These findings provide empirical underpinnings for theories assuming 
that bargaining events influence each other, but also highlight the importance of 
distinguishing between sources and types of information spillover. 
We found considerable evidence in favour of the hypothesis that union negotiators 
are generally more influenced by external information than firm negotiators. Union 
negotiators appeared to be particularly more concerned with information on 
local and sectoral employment, and militancy. They were also more influenced by 
spillovers, particularly when the content of these was related to conflict. 
It was not a priori clear what type of relationship between experience and 
influence of external information to expect. Our findings suggest that more ex-
perienced negotiators were more influenced by some types of external informa-
tion, i.e. militancy and international collective agreement developments, but the 
associations were of rather modest size.
We found little evidence suggesting that sector bargaining was less affected by 
its wider economic environment than company bargaining. However, negotiators 
in sector bargaining were less affected by international and local collective agree-
ment developments and some types of spillover than those in company bargain-
ing, suggesting that sector bargaining operates with relatively more autonomy. 
Recent studies have documented that across European countries, specific sec-
tors are converging (Bechter et al., 2012) and appear to be affected by trans-
national wage coordination (e.g Traxler and Brandl, 2009; Ramskogler, 2012; 
Glassner and Pusch, 2013). Our findings suggests that the impact of international 
collective agreement developments in the Netherlands is still modest compared to 
the impact of developments within the country, but the sample did not allow for a 
sufficiently fine-grained sector-classification to identify particular sectors that were 
more internationally influenced. However, our findings of modest international 
spillovers, coupled with substantial within-country spillovers, suggest that it may 
be important to consider indirect effects that may result when influential wage 
leaders within a country are themselves affected by international developments. 
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Our analyses of the questionnaire survey data yielded an empirical basis for 
a number of assumptions and tacit understandings commonly found in employ-
ment relations literature. The cross-sectional analysis of a single country present-
ed here shows that obtaining information from negotiators directly offers inter-
esting insights into collective bargaining. Some of our findings seem to reflect 
the specific national context in which we collected our data, i.e. dominant sector 
bargaining, a multileveled collective bargaining system and relatively low levels 
of industrial conflict. Hence, analyses of the influence of external information in 
different institutional and economic settings may provide important additional 
insights. It is therefore our hope that future research will replicate our analyses in 
different periods and contexts and that large-scale country comparative surveys 
will incorporate our design. Future research should also consider the effects of 
external information on the outcomes of, and conflicts in collective bargaining 
(c.f. Lehr et al., 2015).
notes
1 In the Netherlands, union density is comparatively low, yet collective agreement coverage is 
high. The consequences of bargaining thus extend beyond union members (Hartog, Leuven 
and Teulings, 2002). Moreover, in the case of industrial action, participation is not limited to 
union members. In fact, it may be used as a tool to attract new members (Akkerman, 2008). 
The readiness of employees to participate may therefore be considered a better indicator of 
bargaining power than unionization.
2 Information on militancy may be considered internal rather than external. We chose to include 
it nevertheless. In contrast to the other factors we analyzed, this factor was not by definition 
contextual but was also an attribute of the bargaining unit. Presumably, the militancy of the 
employees within a bargaining unit is likely to be considered of more importance than that 
of employees elsewhere.
3 Holdouts, i.e. continued negotiation over a new agreement after the old agreement has 
expired, are common in the Netherlands. During holdouts, the old agreement remains intact, 
while the eventual new agreement is usually backdated to coincide with the end date of the 
old agreement (c.f. Ours and Wijngaert, 1996).
4 Two negotiators were involved in a public sector agreement. As a robustness check, all 
findings reported here were replicated with these negotiators excluded from the sample.
5 An appendix fully detailing all the analyses summarized here is available from the first author 
upon request.
6 We present the full analyses of each type of external information separately, in line with the 
aim of this manuscript to provide extensive analyses of all types of external information.
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sUmmarY 
The Influence of External Information on Collective 
Bargaining: Survey Evidence of Union and Firm Negotiators  
in the Netherlands
This paper seeks to answer two questions: 1- To what extent are negotiators in 
collective bargaining influenced by different types of external information? 2- 
How can differences in the influence of external information between negotiators 
be explained by the characteristics of the negotiators and bargaining units? A 
standardized questionnaire measuring self-reported influences of different types 
of external information was developed and administered to a representative 
sample of union and firm negotiators in the Netherlands. In total, 123 negotiators 
participated in the survey. Four types of external information were investigated: 
1- economic information; 2- information on organizational power; 3- institutional 
information; and 4- information spillovers. Descriptive analyses show that economic 
information, particularly when referring to the sector level, was very influential, 
as was institutional information on national and sectoral collective agreement 
developments. Information reflecting organizational power, e.g. militancy, carried 
less weight, while information on other bargaining events, i.e. spillover, was also 
very important. From extant theory, empirical findings and common assumptions in 
labour relations literature, the paper developed and tested a number of hypotheses 
concerning the influence of external information. It was found that the influence 
of spillovers increased with the proximity of their source. Union negotiators were 
generally more influenced by external information than firm negotiators. There 
was some evidence that influence increased with experience, but this effect was 
rather modest. Evidence that negotiators in sector bargaining were less affected 
by the economic environment than negotiators in company bargaining was weak, 
but they were found to be less influenced by spillovers and international collective 
agreement developments. 
KEYWOrDS: collective bargaining, negotiators, information, survey, spillover.
rÉsUmÉ
L’influence de l’information externe sur la négociation 
collective : résultats d’une enquête auprès de négociateurs 
syndicaux et patronaux aux Pays-Bas.
Cet article cherche à répondre à deux questions : 1- dans quelle mesure les per-
sonnes négociant une convention collective sont-elles influencées par divers types 
d’information externe; et 2- comment les différences d’influence de l’information 
externe entre les personnes négociatrices peuvent être expliquées par les carac-
téristiques de ces personnes et les unités de négociation. Un questionnaire stan-
dardisé cherchant à mesurer les influences auto-déclarées de divers types d’infor-
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mation externe a été développé et administré à un échantillon représentatif de 
négociateurs et négociatrices de syndicats et d’employeurs dans les Pays-Bas. Au 
total, 123 négociateurs ont participé à l’enquête. 
Quatre types d’information externe ont été étudiés : 1- information de nature éco-
nomique; 2- information relative au pouvoir organisationnel; 3- information de 
nature institutionnelle; et 4 information relative aux effets de débordement des 
négociations. Les analyses descriptives montrent que l’information de nature éco-
nomique, particulièrement au niveau sectoriel, s’avère très influente, tout comme 
l’information de nature institutionnelle portant sur les développements natio-
naux et sectoriels des conventions collectives. L’information reflétant le pouvoir 
organisationnel, tel le militantisme, aurait moins de poids, alors que l’information 
concernant d’autres aspects liés à la négociation — par exemple, l’effet de débor-
dement —, s’avère très important. 
Selon la théorie existante provenant de résultats de recherches empiriques et d’hy-
pothèses couramment admises dans la littérature des relations de travail, cet arti-
cle développe et vérifie un certain nombre d’hypothèses concernant l’influence de 
l’information externe. Il s’avère que l’influence des effets de débordement s’accroit 
à mesure qu’on se rapproche de leur source. De plus, les négociateurs syndicaux 
sont généralement davantage influencés par l’information externe que leurs vis-
à-vis patronaux. Il appert aussi que l’influence s’accroît avec l’expérience, bien que 
cet effet demeure modeste. L’idée que les personnes négociant au niveau sectoriel 
sont moins influencées par l’environnement économique que celles négociant au 
niveau de l’entreprise n’est pas vraiment accréditée par les résultats. Dans cette 
enquête, il ressort qu’elles sont moins influencées par les effets de débordement et 
par les développements de convention collective au niveau international. 
Mots-clés : négociation collective, négociateurs, information, enquête, retombées.
resUmen
La influencia de la información externa sobre la negociación 
colectiva: resultados de una encuesta con negociadores 
sindicales y patronales en los Países Bajos
Este artículo pretende responder dos preguntas: 1- ¿Hasta qué punto los negocia-
dores de la convención colectiva son influenciados por los diferentes tipos de in-
formación externa? 2- ¿Las diferencias en la manera cómo la información externa 
influencia los negociadores pueden ser explicadas por las características de dichos 
negociadores y de las unidades de negociación? Un cuestionario estandarizado 
fue elaborado con medidas auto-reportadas de la influencia de los diferentes tipos 
de información externa. El instrumento fue administrado a una muestra repre-
sentativa de negociadores sindicales y patronales en los Países Bajos, obteniendo 
la participaron de un total de 123 negociadores. Cuatro tipos de información ex-
terna fueron investigados: 1- la información económica; 2- la información sobre 
el poder organizacional; 3- la información institucional; y 4- las externalidades de 
la información. Los análisis descriptivos que la información económica, particu-
larmente aquellas que conciernen el sector, fueron muy influentes, mientras que 
la información institucional influenció el desarrollo de la negociación a nivel na-
cional y sectorial. La información sobre el poder organizacional, por ejemplo, el 
militantismo, tuvo un peso menos importante, mientras que la información sobre 
otros aspectos de la negociación, tales que las externalidades, fue también muy 
importante. A partir de la teoría, los resultados empíricos y los postulados comunes 
en la literatura sobre relaciones laborales, el artículo desarrolló y verificó  algunas 
hipótesis sobre la influencia de la información externa. Fue corroborado que la in-
fluencia de las externalidades aumenta con la proximidad de la fuente. Los nego-
ciadores sindicales fueron en general más influenciados por la información externa 
que los negociadores patronales. Los resultados sugieren que la influencia se in-
crementa con la experiencia pero este efecto fue más bien modesto. Fue también 
débil el resultado indicando que los negociadores de nivel sectorial fueron menos 
afectados por el contexto económico que los negociadores de nivel empresarial. 
Pero la evidencia fue sólida en el sentido que los negociadores de nivel sectorial 
fueron menos influenciados por las externalidades  y el desarrollo de la negocia-
ción colectiva internacional.
PALABrAS CLAVES: negociación colectiva, negociadores, información, encuesta, exter-
nalidades.
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